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AVAILABILITY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN
SUITS TO ENFORCE THE EDUCATIONAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN WITH
HANDICAPS
IVAN

1.

E. BODENSTEINER·
INTRODUCTION

Children with handicaps have three primary sources of federal
substantive rights relating to their education: the fourteenth amend
ment to the United States Constitution; I the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA);2 and the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.3 These sources are manifestations of judicial and legislative
concern for the welfare of persons with handicaps and they articulate
the scope of the child with handicaps' right to an education while
delineating to some extent the remedies available when those rights
are violated. Attorneys play an important role in vindicating the
rights of persons with handicaps, but professional legal advocacy is
not without cost. Because the "American Rule" generally precludes
an award of attorney fees absent statutory authorization,4 the availa
bility of such awards to plaintiffs who successfully enforce the fed
eral substantive rights of children with handicaps is an issue of great
significance.
• Professor of Law. Valparaiso University School of Law. B.A.. Loras College.
1965; J.D.• University of Notre Dame Law School. 1968.
I. U.S. CON ST. amend XIV.
,
2. Pub. L Ho. 94-142. 89 Stat. 773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1420 (1976 & Supp. V 1981».
3. Pub. L..No. 93-112. 87 Stat. 357 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. §§ 701-796b
(1976 & Supp. V 1981».
4. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y. 421 U.S. 240. 245 (1975). There
are other exceptions to the American Rule. Thus. although fee awards can be based on
contracts or the bad faith of a litigant. and can be awarded out of a common fund. these
theories are generally not applicable to litigation on behalf of children with handicaps.
The bad faith exception can. of course. be utilized in any type of litigation. but because
its availability depends on the conduct of the opposing party it does not attract attorneys
to this type of litigation. Alyeska recognized the inherent power of courts to award fees
when court orders are willfully disobeyed or when a party has acted vexatiously. wan
tonly. or for oppressive reasons either prior to or during the course of litigation. 421 U.S.
at 258-59. See also Roadway Express. Inc. V. Piper. 447 U.S. 752. 765-67 (1980).
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This article will examine each of the. federal substantive rights
relating to the education of children with handicaps in order to de
termine the availability of an award of attorney fees to successful
plaintiffs. Initially, suits against public educational institutions
based on the fourteenth amendment with a cause of action under
section 1983, title 42 of the United States Code, s will be discussed in
view of the provisions of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976 as codified in the same title under section 1988. 6 The
article will next explore the use of section 1988 to secure attorney
fees in a successful action brought under the EAHCA, which does
not expressly provide for an award of attorney fees. 7 Section 505(b)
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 which authorizes an award of
attorney fees to prevailing parties, will then be discussed in light of
the recent judicial limitations imposed on section 504 by the
Supreme Court of the United States. 9 Finally, this article will
demonstrate that as a matter of litigation strategy, plaintiffs should
normally assert substantive claims under all three of these provisions
so as to afford themselves the greatest opportunity to secure an
award of attorney fees.

II.

AUTHORIZATION FOR FEE AWARDS UNDER EACH OF THE
FEDERAL LAWS PROTECTING THE EDUCATIONAL RIGHTS
OF THE HANDICAPPED

A.

The Fourteenth Amendment

It is generally recognized that the development of the educa
tional rights of children with handicaps began with lower court deci
sions based on the fourteenth amendment. This was acknowledged
by the Supreme Court in Boardof Education v. Rowley,1O its first
decision interpreting the EAHCA:.
Both the House and the Senate reports attribute the impetus for
the Act and its predecessors to two federal court judgments ren
dered in 1971 and 1972. As the Senate Report states, passage of
the Act "followed a series of landmark court cases establishing in
5. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
6. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980».
7. See 20 U.S.c. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). While this section does provide for "such
relief as the coun determines is appropriate," it/. etfons to include fees in this authoriza
tion have not been highly successful. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
8. 29 U.S.c. § 794a(b) (Supp. V 1981).
9. See Southwestern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); infra note
201.
10. 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982).
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law the right to education for all handicapped children." 1 1

Since the passage of the EAHCA arid the regulations l2 imple
menting section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act as it relates to the edu
cational rights of children with handicaps, several courts have
recognized that children with handicaps seeking equal educational
opportunities present substantial constitutional questions under the
fourteenth amendment.D This argument has been enhanced by the
recent Supreme Court decision in Plyler v. Doe, 14 which held that
even though undocumented aliens are not to be treated as a suspect
class and that education is not a fundamental right, discrimination in
education is not to be "considered rational unless it furthers some
substantial goal of the State."IS
Even if children with handicaps, like undocumented aliens, do
not constitute a susp'ect class, because education is involved the same
intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied to equal protection
claims in cases brought by children with handicaps. Therefore,
whenever a child with handicaps claims a denial of equal educa
tional opportunity, it is possible to state a substantial constitutional
claim under the equal protection clause. Whenever a child with
handicaps claims a lack of procedural safeguards, there should be a
substantial constitutional claim under the due process clause.
Assuming that children with handicaps can state a substantial
claim under the fourteenth amendment, they have a cause of action
under section 1983. Yet because both the fourteenth amendment
II. Id at 3043 (quoting S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong .. 1st Sess. 6. reprinted in 1975
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1425, 1430. The two cases referred to in the Rowley
decision are Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth. 334 F. Supp.
1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (preliminary injunction), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972)
(permanent injunction), and Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
12. 45 C.F.R: §§ 84.1-.99 (1982).
13. See, e.g.. Monahan v. Nebraska. 687 F.2d 1164. 1172 (8th Cir. 1982); Roben
M. v. Benton. 671 F.2d 1104. 1106 (8th CiT. 1982); Gary B. v. Cronin. 542 F. Supp. 102.
120-23 (N.D. Ill. 1982); William S. V. Gill. 536 F. Supp. 505. 511 (N.D. 111. 1982); Turillo
v. Tyson. 535 F. Supp. 577. 581-82 (D.R.I. 1982); Frederick L. v. Thomas. 408 F. Supp.
832. 834-36 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Fialkowski V. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946. 957-58 (E.D. Pa.
1975). Contra Colin' K. V. Schmidt. 536 F. Supp. 1375. 1388-89 (D.R.1. 1982).
14. 102 S. Ct. 2382. 2398 (1982). It should be noted that Plyler involved a total
exclusion from education and. therefore. differs from San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez. 411 U.S. I (1973) (Texas' school finance scheme does not violate the four
teenth amendment). Because of the special educational needs of children with handi
caps. cases brought on their behalf are more closely analogous to the total exclusion in
Plyler than the "variation in the manner in which education is provided ..." 102 S. Ct.
at 2398. found to be constitutional in Rodriguez.
15. Id at 2398.
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and section 1983 require state action or action under color of state
law,16 the constitutional claims will be available only in suits against
public schools and their officialsY The importance of the availabil
ity of a substantial constitutional claim, which should be asserted
through section 1983, lies in the fact that it can trigger an award of
attorney fees pursuant to section 1988, regardless of whether the
court actually decides the merits of the constitutional claim. So, for
example, if plaintiff prevails under the EAHCA, an issue that should
be resolved first in order to avoid the constitutional issue if possi
ble,18 fees can still be recovered under section 1988. 19
Application of the legislative history, which accompanied the
1976 amendment to section 1988,20 is demonstrated by several
cases,21 including some involving special education. 22 It also applies
where the plaintiff prevails through a settlement rather than full
litigation. 23
16. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2750 (1982). In Lugar, the
Court stated: "[I)t is clear that in a § 1983 action brought against a state official, the
statutory requirement of action 'under color of state law' and the 'state action' require
ment of the fourteenth amendment are identical." ld.
17. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982).
18. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 543(1974).
19. This is made clear in the House Report accompanying the 1976 amendment to
section 1988 which states:
To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under one of the statutes enumerated in
... [the Fees Act) with a claim that does not allow attorney fees, that plaintiff,
if it prevails on the non-fee claim, is entitled to a determination on the other
claim for the purpose of awarding counsel fees. . . . In some instances, how
ever, the claim with fees may involve a constitutional question which the courts
are reluctant to resolve if the nonconstitutional claim is dispositive. . .. In
such cases, if the claim for which fees may be awarded meets the substantiality
test. . ., attorney's fees may be allowed even though the court declines to enter
judgment for the plaintiff on that claim, so long as the plaintiff prevails on the
non-fee claim arising out of a common nucleus of operative fact.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976) (citations omitted); see also Wolf,
Pendent Jurisdiclion, Mull-Claim Liligalion and Ihe 1976 Civil Righls AI/orney's Fees
Awards ACI, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 193 (1979).
20. ld.
21. Compare Oldham v. Ehrlich, 617 F.2d 163, 168 (8th Cir. 1980); Lund v. Af
fleck, 587 F.2d 75, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1978); Kimbrough v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 574
F.2d 423, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1978); Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172, 174 (7th Cir. 1977), cerr.
denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978) wilh Reel v. Arkansas Dep't of Corrections, 672 F.2d 693,
697 -98 (8th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff lost constitutional claim but won on pendent state claim
and was denied fees).
22. Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F;2d 1164, 1172 (8th Cir. 1982); Robert M. v. Ben
ton, 671 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1982); Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F. Supp. 102, 120-23
(N.D. Ill. 1982); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 581-82 (D.R.1. 1982).
23. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); Gary B. v. Cronin, 542 F. Supp.
102, 120-23 (N.D. Ill. 1982).

1983)

ATTORNEY FEES

. 395

Once it is established that a case is within the coverage of sec
tion 1988, the decisions interpreting that section are very favorable
to prevailing plaintiffs. 24 For example, a prevailing plaintiff "should
'ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust."25 A plaintiff does not have to
prevail on all issues raised or achieve all of the benefits soughi,26 but
can prevail through a settlement or consent decree or simply serve as
the catalyst for change brought about without a settlement or con
sent decree,27 and fees can be awarded against state agencies or state
officials in their official capacities. 28 Furthermore, public interest at
torneys employed by funded organizations should be awarded fees
and at the same rate as private counsel. 29 Although there are differ
ent methods for computing the amount of a fee award,30 the hourly
rate should generally be comparable to that prevailing in the com
munity for other complex federal litigation. 31
These points suggest that section 1988 is a very attractive provi
sion for prevailing plaintiffs where it is available, for example, when
a plaintiff states a substantial constitutional claim. A more difficult
question is whether a section 1988 recovery is available to a plaintiff
who is without a substantial constitutional claim and who prevails
under one of the federal statutory provisions. 32
24. While section 1988 authorizes an award of fees to the prevailing party. the
legislative history makes it clear that there is a dual standard. and prevailing defendants
are entitled to fees "only where a plaintiffs lawsuit was brought in bad faith in that it was
clearly frivolous, vexatious or brought for harassment purposes." E.R. LARSON. FED
ERAL COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 87 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LARSOI").
For the legislative history supporting this proposition. see id. at 86-91. For court deci
sions supporting the dual standard, see id. at 91-97.
25. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); LARSON. supra note
24, at 39-44.
26. LARSON, supra note 24, at 51-62.
27. Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980); LARSON, supra note 24. at 62-74.
28. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); LARSON, supra note 24. at 25-32.
29. LARSON, supra note 24, at 99-113.
30. fd. at 115-53.
31. fd. at 155-240.
32. It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the issues which arise in determin
ing whether a plaintiff has prevailed, the method of computing the amount of a fee
award, or the procedures for obtaining an attorney's fee award as these matters are more
than adequately addressed in other writings. See, e.g.. LARSON. supra note 24; C.... LJFOR
NIA RURAL ASSISTANCE, INC.. FEDERAL liTlGATIOI" ATTORNEYS' FEES: A LEG.A,L
SERVICES PRACTICE MANUAL (1981); Derfner, One Gianl Step: The Cil'i/ Rights Allor
nt:}'s Fees Awards Act of /916.21 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 441 (1977); Sl'mposium: Allornt:rs
Fees, 2 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. (1979).
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The Education/or All Handicapped Children Act

The most likely source of fees for a plaintiff prevailing under
the EAHCA is section 1988. 33 This section authorizes fee awards to
prevailing plaintiffs in cases which enforce various federal civil
rights statutes. 34 The EAHCA is not, however, one of the Acts men
tioned in section 1988. Therefore, fees are available under section
1988 only if the EAHCA can be enforced through one of the general
civil rights provisions, such as section 1983. Thus, the initial ques
tion that must be addressed is whether the EAHCA can be enforced
through section 1983. 35
After the Supreme Court decision in Maine v. Thiboutot ,36 it
seemed clear that section 1983 could be used to enforce any federal
statute in suits against persons acting under color of state law. 37 In
Thiboutot, plaintiffs brought an action in state court to enforce sec
tion 602(a)(7) of the Social Security Act38 and used section 1983 as
the basis for the cause of action. 39 After prevailing on the merits,
plaintiffs sought fees under section 1988. The Court held that plain
tiffs should be awarded fees because a cause of action had properly
been asserted under section 1983.40 In a relatively short opinion, the
Court relied on the "plain language" of section 1983-"rights . . .
secured by the Constitution and laws . . . ."41 After examining the
language, the Court stated: "Given that Congress attached no modi
fiers to the phrase ["and laws"], the plain language of the statute
undoubtedly embraces respondents' claim that petitioners violated
the Social Security Act."42 A reasonable reading of Thiboutot would
33. Another potential, but very speculative source, is the jurisdictional provision of
the EAHCA. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(e)(2) (1976). See inya notes 154-58 and accompanying
text.
34. 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000d-2000d-6 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1985 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 20 U..S.C. §§ 1681
1686 (1976) (title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
35. The discussion here will focus on section 1983. Section 1985(3), 42 U.S.c.
§ 1985(3) (Supp. IV 1980), is another possibility but, because neither section 1983 nor
section 1985(3) provide substantive rights and both serve only as a conduit to enforce
other rights, the issues are similar under both.
36. 448 U.S. I (1980).
37. fd at II.
38. 42 U.S.c. § 602(a)(7) (1976).
39. 448 U.S. al 3.
40. fd at 10-12.
41. fd at 4 (emphasis by the Coun).
42. fd For an alternative basis for the decision in Thihoutot based on the legisla
tive history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, see Note, The Applica
tion ofSection 198] to the Violation ofFederal Statutory Rights-Maine v. Thiboutot, 30
DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 662-64 (1981).
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suggest, therefore, that section 1983 could be used to enforce the
EAHCA since it too is a federal statute. 43
It did not take the Supreme Court long to retreat from the ap
parently broad, clear ruling in Thiboutot. First in Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman 44 and then in Middlesex County
Sewerage A ulhority v. N allQnal Sea Clammers Association, 45 the
Court substantially confused the issue.
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the applica
tion of § 1983 to statutory violations. In [Pennhursl} we remanded
certain claims for a determination (i) whether Congress had fore
closed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself.
and (ii) whether the statute at issue there was the kind that created
enforceable "rights" under § 1983. 46

The second exception is not troublesome because a plaintiff cannot
prevail in a section 1983 action where the substantive provision
sought to be enforced conveys no rights, whether it is the constitution
or a federal statute. This is because section 1983 does not provide
any substantive rights but serves only as a conduit or cause of action
for enforcing substantive rights. 47
Analytically, it is unfortunate that the Supreme Court charac
terized that as an exception because a ruling that plaintiff does
not have enforceable rights under a federal statute is a ruling on the
merits, and the case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim,48
rather than on the grounds that section 1983 cannot be utilized to
enforce a statute which establishes no substantive rights in the plain
tiff. This is comparable to the situation in which plaintiff states a
cause of action under section 1983 to enforce the fourteenth amend
ment but the court decides there has been no violation of the four
teenth amendment. Such a plaintiff has stated a claim under section
1983 but simply loses on the merits.49
43. The Coun specifically held in Thibou!o! that section 1988 covers statutory as
well as' constitutional claims. 448 U.S. at 9.
44. 451 U.S. I. 28 (1981) (section 1983 may not provide a cause of action in all
situations where a plaintiff attempts to enforce federal statutory rights).
45. 453 U.S. I (1981).
46. Id at 19: The question was addressed by the Coun even though the plaintiffs
did not assen a section 1983 claim. Id
47. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org .. 441 U.S. 600,617-18 (1979). Simi
larly. section 1985(3) does not provide substantive rights but serves only as a vehicle for
enforcing other rights. Great American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny. 442 U.S. 366, 372
( 1979).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
49. See. e.g.. Dandridge v. Williams, 347 U.S. 471 (1970).
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The first Pennhurst exception mentioned in National Sea Clam
mers ,50 where Congress forclosed private enforcement of section
1983 in the enactment itself, is very troublesome. Rarely, if ever,
does Congress expressly indicate that section 1983 cannot be invoked
to enforce a particular statute. Like the cases raising the question
whether a right of action or certain remedies should be implied
under federal statutes,51 this exception requires the courts to attempt
to ascertain congressional intent in an area where there is little infor
mation that can be of assistance.
Not surprisingly, a substantial amount of time is consumed liti
gating the preliminary question of whether a right of action and cer
tain remedies should be implied under federal statutes. 52 The Court
has suggested that "[w]hen Congress intends private litigants to have
a cause of action to support their statutory rights, the far better
course is for it to specify as much when it creates those rightS."53
Few would dispute that it would be "far better" if Congress did ex
pressly address remedies when it creates rights; however, it is unreal
istic to expect such clarity from Congress in what is often very
controversial legislation. Efforts to set out the technicalities and de
tails of enforcement in every piece of legislation considered by Con
gress could lead to endless debates and stall or prevent the passage of
important legislation. While deploring the amount of time spent on
the implied right of action issue, the Court in National Sea Clam
mers has needlessly required the lower courts to undertake the same
time-consuming inquiry with respect to each federal statute which
plaintiffs attempt to enforce through section 1983. 54
In both of these situations the inquiry into congressional intent
50. 453 U.S. at 19.
51. For a recent Supreme Court decision addressing the implied right issue, see
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825 (1982). In Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Court established four criteria for determining whether to imply a
private right of action. Id at 78. Subsequent decisions, however, have made it clear that
the focus is on the intent of Congress. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,
102 S. Ct. at 1839. See also id at 1839 n.60.
52. An indication of the amount of time spent on this question is given by Justice
Powell: "My research . . . indicates that in the past decade there have been at least 243
reported circuit court opinions and 515 district court opinions dealing with the existence
of implied causes of action under various federal statutes." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen
ner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S. Ct. 1825, 1855 n.17 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979). The clarity sought
by the Court may not be possible given the nature of the legislative process. Steinberg,
Implied Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 41 (1979);
Wartelle & Louden, Private Enforcement ofFederal Statutes: The Role ojthe Section 1983
Remedy, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 487, 536-37 (1982).
54. 453 U.S. at 19-21.
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could easily be avoided. Several years ago in Bell v. Hood,55 the
Court stated:
[W]hen federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded and the federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, fed
eral courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done. 56

Strict application of Bell would make it clear to Congress that the
courts will assume that Congress intends a remedy where it creates a
right and further assume that Congress intends the courts to exercise
the full range of their remedial powers unless expressly restricted by
Congress. Instead of requiring Congress to address enforcement and
remedy in each piece of legislation, Congress would have to face
these questions only when it wants to change the general rule, that is, .
where there is a right there is a remedy.
Similarly, it should be assumed, as suggested in Thipoutot, that
section 1983 means what it says and all federal statutes can be en
forced through section 1983 unless Congress expressly indicates to
the contrary. This is consistent with the test established in Car/son l'.
Green 57 for suits under the Constitution: The defendant must
demonstrate that Congress has provided an alternative, equally ef
fective remedy that was explicitly intended to substitute for recovery
directly under the Constitution. 58 Yet the Supreme Court in Pen
nhurst and National Sea C/ammers has decided to ignore the plain
language of section 1983 and impose a needless obligation on the
lower courts each time a plaintiff seeks to enforce a federal statute
through section 1983.
Under Supreme Court decisions, not only do the lower courts
have to attempt to determine whether Congress intended a private
right of action, but where the answer is affirmative, they must then
determine which remedies Congress intended. This bifurcaied in
quiry is demonstrated by the decision in Transamerica Mortgage Ad
visors, Inc., v. Lewis. 59 After finding an implied right of action under
55. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
56. fd at 684 (footnotes omitted); see also Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U.S. 229, 239 (1969); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916).
57. 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
58. fd at 18-19; see also, Note, Preclusion 0/ Section /983 Causes 0/Action by Com
prehensive Statutory Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
59. 444 U.S. II (1979).
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the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,60 the Court concluded that it is
limited to equitable relief.6t
An example more analogous to the attorney fee situation is
found in Lieberman v. University of Chicago .62 There, the court
raised the question of whether damages are available under title IX
of the Education Amendments of 1972. 63 The question arose after
the Supreme Court held in Cannon v. University of Chicago 64 that
there is an implied right of action under title IX.65 Relying on its
own conclusion that title IX was passed pursuant to the spending
power of Congress, the court in Lieberman adopted the Pennhursl
guidelines66 "for construing implied rights and remedies in the con
text of funding legislation."67
Applying the contract analysis of Pennhurst, the Lieberman
court agreed with the lower court finding that damages are not avail
able under title IX.68 The Seventh Circuit reasoned that absent ex
press congressional language establishing a damage remedy, the
schools could not possibly be agreeing to damage actions in their
acceptance of the federal funds which trigger the application of title
60. 15 U.S.c. §§ 80b-I-80b-21 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
61. 444 U.S. at 19-24.
62. 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981), cerr. denied, \02 S. Ct. 1993-94 (1982).
63. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
64. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
65. Id at 717.
66. The Pennhursl guidelines can be summarized as follows:
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the
spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly ac
cepts the terms of the "contract". . . . There can, of course. be no knowing
acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what
is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. . . . By insisting that
Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.
451 U.S. at 17 (citations omitted). Remedies for violations of funding conditions are
discussed generally in Note, Injunclive Relief From Slale Violalions of Federal Funding
Condilions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1236 (1982).
67. 660 F.2d at 1187. Even if title IX was passed under the spending power. its
reach "is at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress." Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980). One of the regulatory powers is provided by section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment which certainly gives Congress the power to prohibit sex discrim
ination in education, even absent federal funds. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. If Con
gress could have achieved its objective under section 5, then Fullilove suggests that
Congress' acting under the spending power is not a limitation on the scope of the legisla
tion. 448 U.S. at 475-78.
68. 660 F .2d at 1187-88.
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IX. 69 Because the court characterized title IX as part of a bill
designed to assist educational institutions in "accute financial dis
tress," it concluded that Congress did not intend to subject such in
stitutions to "potentially massive financial liability" that might
exceed the federal funds. 70 In essence, the court suggested that Con
gress could not have intended to impose additional financial burdens
on schools accepting the federal funds when the purpose of the Act
was to relieve some of the financial burdens.
One of the leading cases addressing the question whether a
plaintiff prevailing under the EAHCA can recover compensatory
damages and attorney fees also arose in the Seventh Circuit. In An
derson v. Thompson, 71 the court held that section 615(e) of the
EAHCA,n which provides district courts with the power to "grant
such relief as the court determines is appropriate,"73 does not pro
vide for damages unless exceptional circumstances exist. 74 An un
limited. damage remedy was found to be inconsistent with the
legislative intent in passing the EAHCA.7S Two exceptional circum
stances were recognized: First, where parents make alternate ar
rangements to those offered by the school system in order to avoid a
serious risk of injury to the child's physical health; and second,
where the school system acts in bad faith in failing to make available
the procedural protections of the EAHCA which could result in an
appropriate placement. 76 In so holding, the Anderson court has sug
gested that parents should be allowed to recoup the cost c,f the alter
native arrangements. 77
.Because the plaintiffs in Anderson sought attorney fees under
section 1988, the court had to address the question of whether sec
tion 1983 could be used as a conduit to attorney fees under section
69. ld
70. ld Even if one accepts the Pennhursl contract analysis for purposes of deter
mining whether funding legislation provides rights, 451 U.S. at 47-51,53-55 (White, J.,
dissenting), it is not clear that this analysis supports the exclusion of damages under
statutes such as title IX which do create such rights. Entities which accept federal funds
should be aware that damages can be assessed for breach of the "contract."
71. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
72. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(e) (1976).
73. ld
74. 658 F.2d at 1209-14.
75. ld
76. ld at !213-14.
77. ld For cases relying on Anderson, but finding that exceptional circumstances
have not been demonstrated, see Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 811-12 (1st Cir. 1982);
Mark R. v. Board of Educ., 546 F. Supp. \027, 1030-32 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
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1988. 78 This, of course, required a determination of whether section
1983 can be used to enforce the EAHCA.79 Relying on Pennhurst,
the Anderson court stated that "despite Thiboutot, section 1983 is not

applicable in situations 'where the governing statute provides an ex
clusive remedy for violations of the Act.' "80 The EAHCA does not
expressly indicate that it provides an exclusive remedy. To deter
mine whether the statutory remedy under the EAHCA was intended
to be exclusive, the Anderson court looked to Brown v. General Serv
ices Administration 8) and Great American Federal Savings and Loans
Association v. Novotny.82 These cases direct the courts to an exami
nation of the legislative history and the structure of the statute to
determine whether Congress intended it to be exclusive. As with the
implied right of action inquiry,83 the courts are left to struggle with
the question of congressional intent in situations where there is fre
quently no indication of that intent. 84
Addressing the EAHCA, the court in Anderson indicated that
the statute, "like the statutes at issue in Brown and Novotlij', contains
an elaborate administrative and judicial enforcement system."85
Next, the court indicated that "Congress when enacting the EAHCA
also believed that the rights it was creating had heretofore been inad
equately protected under federal law."86 This reason is somewhat
suspect. Clearly, the EAHCA was a recognition that the rights of
children with handicaps were not being adequately protected by the
states and local schools. But certainly Congress was not suggesting
78. The court summarily concluded that the "EAHCA does not itself provide for
attorney's fees." 658 F.2d at 1217. See infra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
79. 658 F.2d at 1214-15. While the Seventh Circuit addressed the availability of
section 1983 in order to determine whether fees could be awarded under section 1988, if
section 1983 is available to enforce the EAHCA, then a plaintiff should be able to seek
damages under section 1983 even if the EAHCA itself does not provide for such dam
ages. It could be argued that section 1983 is available, but only to the extent that it is not
inconsistent with the EAHCA. But see Calhoun v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 550 F.
Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1982). Thus, if a court finds that damages are not available under
the EAHCA, it then would not allow them under section 1983.
80. ld. at 1215 (citations omitted).
81. 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (section 717 of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides the exclusive judicial remedy for employment discrimination claims brought by
federal employees).
82. 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (42 U.S.c. § 1985(3) (Supp. IV 1980) creates no substantive
rights and therefore cannot be utilized to enforce the provisions of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
83. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 51-70 and accompanying text. While the task is similar, it will
be suggested that the test is different. See infra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
85. 658 F.2d at 1216.
86. Id.

1983)

ATTORNEY FEES

403

that the right of children with handicaps to an equal educational
opportunity had not been established. To the contrary, the legisla
tive history of the EAHCA makes it apparent that Congress was act
ing to assist the states in complying with the court decisions
establishing the right of children with handicaps to an equal educa
tional opportunity under the fourteenth amendment. 87
Finally, the court found the most compelling reason for its con
clusion that the EAHCA provides the exclusive remedy to be "that
the relief it provides is inconsistent with section 1983 relief."88 Ac
cording to the court, the two are inconsistent because section 1983
provides for damages whereas the court had already concluded that
the EAHCA does not provide for damages absent exceptional cir
cumstances. In summary the court stated:
[T]he availability of a private right of action under the EAHCA,
the detailed statutory administrative and judicial scheme, the fact
that Congress intended the EAHCA to create new rights, and the
absence of a traditional damage remedy, together compel our con
clusion that the judicial remedy provided in the EAHCA was in
tended to be exclusive. 89

There are several grounds on which to challenge the result
reached in Anderson. First, the legislative history does not support
the conclusion that "Congress intended the EAHCA to create new
rights."90 To the contrary, Congress passed the EAHCA primarily
to provide financial assistance to the states to help them comply with
existing constitutional rights as found by several decisions. 91 While
the EAHCA created new rights in the sense that it made financial
assistance available and provided a federal statutory basis for the
right to an equal educational opportunity, Congress clearly recog
nized that this right already existed under the fourteenth
amendment. 92
Second, the fact that the statute establishes a "detailed statutory
administrative and judicial scheme"93 in no way implies that Con
87. See, e.g." S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, 13. 17.22-24, reprinted in
1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1425, 1429·31, 1437, 1440-41, 1446-48 (hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 168); H.R. REP. No. 332, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, 10, 19 (hereinafter
cited as H.R. REP. No. 332).
88. 658 F.2d at 1216.
89. Id at 1217.
90. Id
91. See supra note 87.
92. Id
93. 658 F.2d at 1217.
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gress intended to exclude section 1983 actions. It is just as logical to
conclude that Congress established this scheme because it wanted to
ensure that the states set up an administrativ~ enforcement mecha
nism to eliminate the necessity for every aggrieved person to file a
lawsuit. 94 Administrative proceedings are generally more accessible
to parents and children, particularly those who cannot afford the
services of an attorney. Certainly the fact that a federal statute man
dates a state administrative procedure in no way suggests that sec
tion 1983 should not be available. Nothing in the legislative history
of the EAHCA suggests that Congress intended to preclude section
1983 actions. Every indication is that Congress was attempting to
increase enforcement of the rights of children with handicaps. This
is made clear in the Senate Committee report: .
The Committee wishes to clarify, however, that it does not intend
the existence of such an entity [for insuring compliance in the
states] to limit the right of individuals to seek redress of grievances
through other avenues, such as bringing civil action in Federal or
State courts to protect and enforce the rights of handicapped chil
dren under applicable law.95

The existence of a state administrative procedure was not deter
minative in Thiboulol. The Social Security Act expressly requires
the states to make an administrative hearing process available to re
cipients who wish to contest agency action. 96 The EAHCA differs
from the Social Security Act in that the former provides for judicial
review of the agency decision in either federal or state court. In con
trast, the Social Security Act is silent on this topic. Judicial review of
the agency decision, however, is available in most states under an
administrative procedure act. Therefore, the only real difference be
tween the EAHCA and the Social Security Act is that the former
provides for judicial review of the state administrative proceedings
94. This was recognized by the Senate Committee:
It should not, however, be necessary for parents throughout the country to con
tinue utilizing the couns to assure themselves a remedy. It is this Committee's
belief that the Congress must take a more active role under its responsibility for
equal protection of the laws to guarantee that handicapped children are pro
vided equal educational opponunity. It can no longer be the policy of the Gov
ernment to merely establish an unenforceable goal requiring all children to be
in school. S. 6 takes positive necessary steps to ensure that the rights of c~ldren
and their families are protected.
S. REP. No. 168, supra note 87, at 9, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
1433.
95. fd. at 26. reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1450.
96. See 42 U.S.c. § 602(a)(4) (1976); 45 C.F.R. § 205.10 (1982).
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in a federal court, as well as a state court. The judicial remedy pro
vided by section 615(e)(2) of the EAHCA is clearly in the nature of
judicial review rather than an original action. 97 It seems rather tenu
ous to conclude that Congress, simply by making judicial review of
the state agency proceedings available in federal court as well as
state court, intended to preclude section 1983 actions to enforce the
EAHCA when such actions are available to enforce the Social Secur
ity Act.
There is evidence in the legislative history that Congress ex
pressly provided a judicial remedy in section 6l5(e)(2) of the
EAHCA not because it wanted to preclude an action under section
1983, but rather because it wanted to assure that judicial review of
state agency action could be obtained in a federal court. The House
Committee expressed concern about the lack of enforcement in the
states even though most of them make education for children with
handicaps mandatory.98 Absent the provision in section 615(e)(2),
such federal court review of state agency action would not have been
possible. 99 Further, by limiting the judicial proceeding- to review of
agency action, it is less likely that Congress even considered the rem
edy question because compensatory damages are n-ormally not avail
able in state administrative proceedings. loo This being true, there
would be no reason to submit evidence relating to damages to the
administrative hearing officer and, therefore, the record -being re
viewed by the court would not include evidence relating to damages.
In federal court the seventh amendment to the United States Consti
tution assures a jury trial in actions seeking compensatory dam
97.

Specifically. the statute slates:
Any party aggrieved by the findings and decisions made [by the state edu
cational agency) ... shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to
the complaint presented pursuant to this section. which action may be brought
in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United,
States without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action brought
under this paragraph. the court shall receive the records of the administrative
proceedings. shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and, bas
ing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as
the court determines is appropriate.
20 U.S.c. § l4IS(e)(2) (1976).
98. H. REP. No. 332, supra note 87, at 10 (legislation without "meaningful provi
sions for actual enforcement, has proven to be of limited value").
99. De novo actions under section 1983 would have been available to enforce the
EAHCA but Congress was seeking to improve nonjudicial enforcement and the availa
bility of judicial review 'tends to improve agency proceedings.
100. The EAHCA provision mandating the administrative procedures does not ad
dress the remedy question. See 20 U.S.c. § 141S (1976).
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ages. 101 While section 615(e)(2) allows the court to "hear additional
evidence at the request of a party," there is no evidence that Con
gress intended jury trials under section 615(e)(2). Quite simply, re
quiring a state administrative remedy and providing for judicial
review of the agency proceedings in no way suggests that Congress
intended to preclude section 1983 actions for damages.
The policy reasons advanced in Anderson, supporting the con
clusion that damages are not available under the EAHCA,102 are not
convincing for a number of reasons. First, the concerns expressed
are partially served by the doctrine of qualified immunity, which ap
plies in section 1983 actions seeking damages from school officials
for violations of the EAHCA. 103 Difficulty in diagnosing children
with handicaps and uncertainty about some of the handicapping
conditions lO4 may provide a basis for a qualified immunity defense.
As expressed by the Supreme Court in its most recent decision on
this topic, Harlow v. Fitzgerald,lOs "[w]e therefore hold that govern
ment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known."I06 The determi
nation of whether clearly established rights were violated can usually
be made on a motion for summary judgment. 107 Therefore, school
officials making a "good faith effort to provide a child with an ap
propriate education ... "108 would not be "exposing themselves to
monetary liability for incorrect placements. . . ."109
School corporations or entities, however, are not protected by
this immunity.IIO It is, however, not at all clear why school corpora
tions should be insulated from damages when they violate the rights
of children with handicaps under the EAHCA. Concern about the
IO\. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
102. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
103. Qualified immunity protects public officials who act in good faith. See, e.g.,
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982); Supreme Court v. Consumers Union of the
United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719 (1980); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978);
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
104. 658 F.2d at 1212.
105. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
106. Id. at 2738 ..
107. Id. at 2737-39.
108. 658 F.2d at 1213.
109. Id.
110. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 635-38 (1980).
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school system's lack of available funds for education III could insu
late the schools from any damage action, not just those under the
EAHCA. . This is directly contrary to the Supreme Court's decision
in Owen v. City of Independence, 112 which holds that municipal enti
ties are responsible for damages caused by actions of officials taken
pursuant to the policy of the municipality.113 Because respondeat
superior liability is not available, school corporations would be lia
ble only where the violations are caused by official policy.1l4
Another argument supporting a damage award for violations of
the EAHCA flows from the language of section 6IS(e)(2) itself. It
states that the court "shall grant such relief as [it] determines is ap
propriate."IIS On its face, this would seem to allow any relief, in
cluding damages. The court in Anderson, however, concluded that
the term "appropriate," when viewed in its context in section
61S(e)(2), "was generally intended to be restricted to injunctive re
lief. . . ." 116 In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied on the
failure to demonstrate a co.ngressional intent to create a damage
remedy. 117
The problem with this analysis is that it requires plaintiff to
demonstrate evidence of a congressional intent to provide for dam
ages, whereas under National Sea Clammers, the test should be
whether the defendant can demonstrate that Congress intended to
preclude damages under section 1983. 118 The court in Anderson ad
mits that the "legislative history of the [EAHCA] is silent on the
question of whether a damage remedy was intended." 119 This being
the case, it must be presumed that section 1983 and the remedies it
provides are available.
In National Sea Clammers, the Court was looking for factors
tending "to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy
of suits under § 1983."120 Although the Court did not require an
express indication of congressional intent, it did require a showing of
such an intent rather than simply the absence of an intention to
III.
112.

658 F.2d at 1212-13.
445 U.S. 622 (1980).
113. Id at 644-50.
114. Id at 655 n.39; see also Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658.
690-95 (1978) ..
115. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1976).
116. 658 F.2d at 1211.
117. Id at 1211-12.
118. 453 U.S. at 20.
119. 658 F.2d at 1211.
120. 453 U.S. at 20.
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make damages available. 121 Justice Stevens, in dissent, suggested
that the Court improperly placed the burden on the section 1983
plaintiff. After stating that "the question is not whether Congress
'intended to preserve the § 1983 right of action,' but rather whether
Congress intended to withdraw that right of action,"122 Justice Ste
vens indicated that the dispute involved more than semantics. 123
Justice Stevens is correct in this assertion. The proper applica
tion of National Sea Clammers is demonstrated by the decision in
Ryans v. New Jersey Commission for the Blind,124 where the court
compared the inquiry under National Sea Clammers to that involved
in determining the existence of an implied private right of action. 125
121. ld. at 27 n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. ld. at 27.
123. Specifically, Justice Stevens stated:
As the Court formulates the inquiry, the burden is placed on the § 1983 plaintiff
to show an explicit or implicit congressional intention that violations of the
substantive statute at issue be redressed in private § 1983 actions. The correct
formulation. however, places the burden on the defendant to show that Con
gress intended to foreclose access to the § 1983 remedy as a means of enforcing
the substantive statute. Because the § 1983 plaintiff is invoking an express pri
vate remedy that is, on its face, applicable any time a violation of a federal
statute is alleged,. . . the burden is properly placed on the defendant to show
that Congress, in enacting the particular substantive statute at issue, intended
an exception to the general rule of § 1983. A defendant may carry this burden
by identifying express statutory language or legi~lative history revealing Con
gress' intent to foreclose the § 1983 remedy, or by establishing that Congress
intended that the remedies provided in the substantive statute itself be
exclusive.
ld. at 27 n.11 (citation omitted). The majority, in responding to Justice Stevens, indi
cated that it does "not suggest that the burden is on a plaintiff to demonstrate congres
sional.intent to preserve § 1983 remedies." ld. at 21 n.31; see also Wartelle & Louden,
supra note 53, at 540-42; Comment, Section 198] and Ihe Privale Enforcemem o/Federal
Stalules: A New Fromier for the Civil War Legislation, 18 WILLAMEITE L.J. 433,461-66
(1982).
124. 542 F. Supp. 841, 846-49 (D.N.J. 1982).
125. ld. at 848. In addressing the issue of private rights of action, the court in
Ryans stated:
A court will not presume to find a private right of action in a statute silent as to
remedy unless there is some evidence to indicate that the legislature impliedly
intended one to exist. In determiiling the exclusivity question, on the other
hand, the court must presume a § 1983 right of action to exist unless there is
evidence in the underlying statute which suggests an intent on the part of Con
gress to foreclose such an action. It is quite possible to find in the same statute,
therefore, the absence of any intention on the part of Congress to either create
an implied right of action or to preclude the assertion of a § 1983 action. In
such a case, as in ThiboUIOI. an individual aggrieved under the terms of the
statute would be entitled to bring a § 1983 action against state officials but not
private parties.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
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In so doing, the court concluded that title I of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 126 does not provide an implied right of action 127 but can be
enforced through section 1983 after exhaustion of the administrative
remedies provided by the Act. 128
The reasoning and analysis of Ryans is more important than its
result. 129 The holding was less difficult than cases involving the
EAHCA because title I of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, while re
quiring state administrative procedures, contains no judicial reme
dies. Thus, the Ryans court found the situation more analogous to
Thiboutot than National Sea Clammers .130
In order to determine whether it would be inconsistent with the
EAHCA to allow enforcement actions pursuant to section 1983, it is
necessary to address the practical ramifications of allowing such ac
tions. First, since section 1983 provides for damages, it would allow
an additional remedy which Anderson held was available directly
under the EAHCA only in two exceptional circumstances. 13I Al
though damages would be available under section 1983, school offi
cials could raise qualified immunity as all affirmative defense.132
Injunctive relief is also available under section 1983, but this is avail
able directly under the EAHCA as well. Finally, section 1983 would
make it possible for prevailing plaintiffs to seek attorney fees under
section 1988. It can be demonstrated that the availability of section
1983 is not at all inconsistent with the EAHCA.
.
In a case in which a child with handicaps challenges the ade
quacy of the educational opportunity made available, the first step
126. 29 U.S.c. §§ 720-750 (1976 & Supp. v 1981).
127. 542 F. Supp. at 846: see also Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs .•
504 F. Supp. 1244, 1248-51 (N.D. Ill. 1981), affd in part. rev'd and remanded in part. 689
F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff obtained all the relief sought under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, thus the coun did not decide whether title I could be en
forced through section 1983).
128. The recent holding of the Supreme Coun in Patsy v. Board of Regents. 102 S.
Ct. 2557 (1982), that a section 1983 plaintiff does not have to exhaust state administrative
remedies absent a congressional intent to require such exhaustion, id. at 2566, was distin
guished by the Ryans coun because Congress had made "express provision for a state
administrative scheme, [andJ its intent to require exhaustion of that scheme may readily
be inferred." 542 F. Supp. at 850 n.13.
129. Similar approaches are suggested in Wanelie & Louden, supra note 46, at
540-42: Comment, supra note 123. at 457-66; Note, supra note 58, at 1199-1205.
130. 542 F. Supp. at 848-49.
131. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
132. Gomez v. Toledo. 446 U.S. 635. 641 (1980). The school board and the munic
ipal corporation or entity can be sued under section 1983, Monell v. Depanment of So
cial Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), but it does not enjoy a qualified immunity for the
wrongful conduct of its officers. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 662 (1980).
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would normally be the administrative proceedings mandated by sec
tion 615 of the EAHCA.133 Exhaustion of these remedies would not
be required where it would be futile or where the administrative
remedy would be inadequate. 134 Assuming that the matter is not sat
isfactorily resolved at the administrative level, the child with handi
cap could seek judicial review in federal court pursuant to section
615(e)(2). Under Anderson, relief based on this claim would nor
mally be limited to injunctive relief. 135
. The child with handicaps could also assert a claim under section
1983, alleging violations of the EAHCAI36 and seeking not only in
junctive relief, but also compensatory damages and attorney fees.
The court could conduct a bifurcated proceeding. If plaintiff seeks
relief in the nature of a preliminary injunction, the judicial review
portion of the case could be decided promptly, with or without addi
tional evidence, and the section 1983 claim for damages could subse
quently be submitted to a jury. In the latter aspect of the case, the
school officials could, or course, assert a qualified immunity defense.
The congressional purposes in mandating the state administrative
proceedings through section 615 of the EAHCA would be satisfied
by plaintiff's filing of an administrative complaint before proceeding
in federal court. 13? If plaintiff prevails in the administrative pro
ceedings, injunctive relief would no longer be necessary but the
plaintiff may still bring a section 1983 action seeking compensatory
damages for violation of rights secured by the EAHCA.
The courts are divided on the question of whether section 1983
is available to enforce the EAHCA.138 Several of the decisions hold
133. McGovern v. Sullins, 676 F.2d 98, 99 (4th Cir. 1982); Scruggs v. Campbell,
630 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1980); Mitchell v. Walter, 538F. Supp. 1111,1112-14 (S.D.
Ohio 1982); H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215, 221 (D. Md. 1981) ..
134. See, e.g., Monahan v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 597 (8th Cir. 1981); Doe v.
Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
135. 658 F.2d at 1210.
136. It would normally be advantageous for the plaintiff to assen claims under the
founeenth amendment and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as well.
137. This was suggested by the coun in Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 984
(N.D. Tex. 1981), but was rejected by the Anderson coun. 658 F.2d at 1216 n.16. See
also Ryans v. New Jersey Comm'n for the Blind, 542 F. Supp .. at 849-52; H.R. v.
Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215,222-23 (D. Md. 1981).
138. Compare Roben M. v. Benton, 671 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1982); Jose P. v.
Ambach, 669 F.2d 865,869-71 (2d Cir. 1982); Depanment of Educ. v. Katherine D., 531
F. Supp. 517, 531 (D. Hawaii 1982); Mattie T. v. Holladay, 522 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D.
Miss. 1981); Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 983-84 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (section 1983 is
available to enforce the EAHCA) Wlih McGovern v. Sullins, 676 F.2d 98, 99 (4th Cir.
1982); Calhoun v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Noe v.
Ambach, 542 F. Supp. 70, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375.
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ing that section 1983 is not available rely onAnderson. 139 Those de
cisions not citing Anderson do not advance any new arguments. A
question not answered by Anderson is whether a plaintiff can use
section 1983 to enforce rights under the EAHCA when a state re
fuses to provide the administrative remedy mandated under section
615 of the EAHCA.
That issue is currently pending before the Seventh Circuit in
J)oe v. Koger .140 In Koger, the district court found that defendants
violated the EAHCA by expelling a child with handicaps in accord
ance with normal disciplinary procedures "without first determining,
by [EAHCA] procedures, whether his propensity to disrupt was the
result of his inappropriate placement." 141 The court did not indicate
whether it was enforcing the EAHCA through section 615(e)(2) or
through section 1983. It subsequently denied, however, the plain
tiffs request for fees under section 1988 on the basis of Anderson .142
Because the judicial proceedings authorized by section 615(e)(2)
are in the nature of judicial review of the state agency's determina
tion and because defendants in Koger refused to utilize the adminis
trative procedures mandated by section 615, it is not clear that a
plaintiff who seeks an injunction requiring the state to conduct pro
. ceedings under section 615 to determine the relationship between the
disruptive behavior and the handicap can proceed under section
615(e)(2).143 Assuming that the answer is negative, such a plaintiff
would be without a judicial remedy for a clear violation of the
1389 n.20 (D.R.I. 1982); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 580-81 (D.R.I. 1982); Ruth
Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 473-75 (S.D. Tex. 1982); Akers
v. Bolten, 531 F. Supp. 300, 316 (D. Kan. 1981) (section 1983 is not available). The
question was recently avoided in Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 975-77 (8th Cir.
1982). See generally Note, A ConfUSion of Rights and Remedies: Tatro v. Texas, 14
CONN. L. REV. 585, 593-96 (1982).
139. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 550 F. Supp.796 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Davis v. Maine Endwell Cent. School Dist., 542 F. Supp. 1257, 1261-62 (N.D.N.Y.
1982); Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 468, 473-75 (S.D.
Tex. 1982); Akers v. Bolton, 531 F. Supp. 300, 316 (D. Kan. 1981).
140. 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979). appeal docketed, No. 82-1805 (7th Cir.
May 19, 1982). The author is the attorney of record on appeal.
141. Jd at 229; see also Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982): S-1 v.
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir.), cerr. denied, 454 U.S. 1030 (1981): Stuan v. Nappi.
443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
142. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
143. It may be that this is a situation where exhaustion is not required because it
would be futile or there is not an adequate administrative remedy. See supra note 134
and accompanying text. The state. however. may have a suitable administrative process
but contends that school disciplinary proceedings are not covered by section 615 of the
EAHCA. For a discussion of disciplinary exclusions under the EAHC A. see Note. Disci·
plinary Exclusion of Handicapped Students: An Examination of the Limitations Imposed
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EAHCA unless section 1983 is available. States could avoid en
forcement of the EAHCA by simply refusing to establish the admin
istrative procedures mandated by section 615.
At least one court of appeals has suggested that section 1983 is
available to enforce the EAHCA in this situation. In Hymes v. Har
nell County Board ofEducation, 144 the court awarded fees under sec
tion 1983 because "no judicial relief route is provided in the
EAHCA, to prevent an alteration in the educational placement of a
child, pending administrative determination (and any appeal there
from to the courtS)."145 The situation in Hymes is very similar to
Koger in that the litigation sought "to obtain restoration to the regu
lar school program" 146 pending the outcome of administrative
proceedings.
Concerning the applicability of section 615(e)(2), the court in
Hymes stated that the EAHCA provides no jurisdictional basis for a
suit to enforce the right to remain in status quo prior to the comple
tion of the administrative process. 147 The court reemphasized that
section 615(e)(2) limits the jurisdictional provisions of EAHCA to
actions of any party aggrieved by the findings and decisions in an
administrative hearing conducted by the state or local educational
by the Education/or All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,51 FORDHAM L. REV. 168
(1982).
144. 664 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1981).
145. fd. at 413. See also Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981). In
Tatro, the court concluded that a section 1983 action was available as long as the plaintiff
had exhausted administrative remedies under section 615(e). The court stated that
"[w]hatever may be the role of § 1983 where the attack is upon the adequacy of proce
dures themselves, this court sees no role for § 1983 here." fd. at 984.
146. 664 F.2d at 411.
147. Specifically, the court in Hymes stated:
If the current educational placement at that time had remained the normal
classroom program, EAHCA appears to mandate that the child should have
been allowed to remain in the program pending the outcome of state or local
administrative proceedings. 20 U.S.c. § 1415(e)(3). Yet the EAHCA provides
no jurisdictional basis for a suit to enforce the right to remain in statu quo [sic]
. prior to completion of the administrative process. 20 U.S.c. § l4l5(e)(2) limits
the jurisdictional provisions of EAHCA to actions of any party aggrieved by the
findings and decision in an administrative hearing conducted by the state or
local educational agency. Obviously, no such findings and decision were extant
at the time the reinstatement relief was sought in federal court and gained
through a negotiated settlement between the parties.
Here, in fact, the child had already been removed from the normal class
room program placement. In that stance, he had, under EAHCA, even less
access to any jurisdiction of the federal court.
fd. at 412 n.2.
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agency.14!< Under this rationale, section 1983 should be available to
enforce the EAHCA in some circumstances even if the Anderson de
cision is correct in holding that section 1983 is generally not
available.
Courts have been struggling with the application of Pennhurst
and National Sea Clammers in cases involving plaintiffs' attempts to
use section 1983 to enforce federal statutes other than those relating
to the educational rights of children with handicaps. Most decisions
have avoided the more difficult question by concluding that the
plaintiff either has no rights under the substantive federal statute or
did not state a violation of the statute. 149 Other courts have consid
ered the comprehensiveness of the remedy and the inconsistency
with the federal substantive statute to preclude the use of section
1983 to enforce a federal statute. 150 Another court summarily con
cluded, relying on Th,boutotand Cuyler v. Adams,'51 that a plaintiff
could use section 1983 to enforce the Interstate Agreement on De
tainers. 152 These cases provide little help in deciding the issue dis
cussed here; rather, they simply confirm the uncertainty which was
unnecessarily created by the decisions in Pennhurst and National Sea
Clammers.
A second argument in favor of an award of attorney fees under
148. Id
,149. See. e.g.. Local Div. 732. Amalgamated Transit Union v. Metropolitan At
lanta Rapid Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 1327, 1345-46 (11th Cir. 1982) (no violation of the
Urban Mass Transponation Act); Perry v. Housing Auth., 664 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (4th
CiT. 1981) (various sections of the Housing Act do nOl create legally cognizable rights in
tenants): Brown v. Sibley. 650 F.2d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1981) (no allegation or showing
of a violation of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973): Lloyd v. lIlinois Regional
Transp. Auth .. 548 F. Supp. 575, 587 (N.D. 111. 1982) (Urban Mass Transponation Act):
Thompson v. Binghamton Hous. Auth .. 546 F. Supp. 1158, 1180-83 (N.D.N.Y. 1982)
(Housing Act creates no substantive rights); Weems v. Pierce, 534 F. Supp. 740, 744-45
(D. 111. 1982) (relying on Perry v. Housing Auth.); see also Operating Engineers Local 3
v. Bo~. 541 F. Supp. 486, 491-93 (D. Utah 1982) (coun recognized the issues but did not
decide whether the Davis-Bacon Act can be enforced through section 1983).
150. Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New York, 676 F.2d 20, 22-23 (2d CiT.
1982) (Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA) provides exclu
sive remedy): Amoco Oil Co. v. Local 99, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work
ers. 536 F. Supp. 1203, 1217-18 (D.R.1. 1982) (same reasoning utilized to preclude use of
42 U.s.c. § 1985(3) (Supp. IV 1980) to enforce the National Labor Relations Act);
Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 518 F. Supp. 1161. 1176-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Congress. in pass
ing Urban Mass Transponation Act, did not intend to create rights enforceable through
section 1983). affd in pari, rev'd in pari, 687 F.2d 644 (2d CiT. 1982).
151. 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
152. Bush v. Muncy. 659 F.2d 402. 406 (4th Cir. 1981): if. McGhee v. Housing
Auth.. 543 F. Supp. 607. 608-10 (N.D. Ala. 1982) (although there is no implied right of
action under the Brooke Amendment. 42 U.S.c. § 1437a (West Supp. 1982). it can be
enforced through section 1983).
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the EAHCA relies on the following language of section 6l5(e)(2):
"[i]n any action brought under this paragraph the court shall . . .
grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate." 153 As noted
earlier, the court in Anderson concluded that this language does not
generally authorize a damage remedy. 154 The court also concluded,
very summarily, that the "EAHCA does not itself provide for attor
ney's fees . . . ."155 If "such relief as the court determines is appro
priate" does not include damages, it is even less likely that it
provides for an award of attorney fees.
The legislative history is silent on this question and there appear
to be no reported decisions, other than Anderson, on point. It is clear
that attorney fees, however, are not available unless a case falls
within one of the exceptions to the "American Rule" 156 which gener
ally prohibits an award of fees. 157 While one of the exceptions is
where Congress provides for fees by statute, this seems to apply only
where Congress has made "specific and explicit provisions for the
allowance of attorneys' fees. . . . "158 Absent any authority on
point, it would seem fair to say that a recovery of fees based on the
language of section 6l5(e)(2) is highly unlikely ..
C.

The Rehabilitation Act oj'1973

In contrast to the EAHCA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ex
plicitly provides for attorney fees. It was amended in 1978 to add
153. 20 U.S.c. § 14J5(e)(2) (1976).
154. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. Although the coun in Ander
son found that a limited damage award might be appropriate in two exceptional circum
stances, it is not clear whether the coun found this to be expressly authorized by the
statute or whether it is implied under the statute. 658 F.2d at 1210-14. In Miener v.
Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982), the coun stated that
"[a)lthough some courts have asses5ed the availability of damages under a Cort v. Ash
analysis, e.g., Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1979), we eschew this
approach in favor of the narrower focus adopted in Anderson . ..." fd. at 979.
The "narrower focus" apparently refers to the question of whether Congress in
tended damages to be included in "appropriate" relief. Several couns have agreed that
damages are not available under the EAHCA. Davis v. Maine Endwell Cent. School
Dist., 542 F. Supp. 1257, 1261 (N.D.N.Y. 1982); Reineman v. Valley View Community
School Dist., 527 F. Supp. 661, 664 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Loughran v. Flanders, 470 F. Supp.
110, 115 (D. Conn. 1979). But see, Parks v. Parkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296, 311-13 (N. D. Ill.
1982).
155. Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d at 1217.
156. See Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co. v. Wildeness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 260-62
(1975).
157. Id at 260.
158. fd The coun cited several statutes in which Congress did make such specific
and explicit provisions. fd at 260-61 n.33.
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new section 505 which provides: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costS."159
Although the act refers to the discretion of the court, the language is
almost identical to that in section 1988 under which a prevailing
plaintiff is entitled to fees as a matter of course unless special circum
stances would render an award unjust. l60 Because of the similarity
in language and the legislative history, courts generally have recog
nized that fee awards under section 505(b) "are governed by the
same considerations controlling in section 1988 actions."lbl The leg
islative history clearly supports these cases.
Both the House Report '62 and the Senate Report '63 refer to the
failure of section 504 to provide for attorney fees as an omission.
The Senate Report refers to testimony which notes the unavailability
of section 1988 and suggests the need for the same coverage. 1M Re
marks made on the floor of the Senate are more explicit. Senator
Cranston,165 author of the attorney fee provision in section 505,
stated:
I emphasize that it is intended that interpretation of the attorney's
fee provision in the committee bill be analogous to interpretations
of ... [section 1988]. The legislative history and expressions of
legislative intent with respect to ... [section 1988] are applic'lble
to the new section 505(b). Thus, for example, the discussion of
"prevailing party" and "reasonable fees" found in the Senate
Committee Report to accompany H.R. 15460 (H. Rept. No. 95
1558), in particular pages 6 to 9, would be applicable whenever
there is judicial consideration of the handicapped attorney's fees
provision contained in proposed section 505(b).166

Senator Cranston went on to highlight several points in stressing
29 U.S.c. § 794a(b) (Supp. v 1981).
LARSON, supra note 24, at 33-83.
Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs., 689 F.2d 724, 730 n.8 (7th Cir.
1982); see also Disabled in Action v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 685 F.2d 881,
885 n.4 (4th Cir. 1982); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 345-48 (8th
Cir. 1980).
162. H.R. REP. No. 1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1978). reprillled in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 7312-32.
163. S. REP. No. 890, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20 (1978).
164. Itt.
165. In Federal Energy Admin. V. Algonquin SNG, Inc .. 426 U.S. 548 (1976). the
Court indicated that "a statement of one of the legislation's sponsors ... deserves to be
accorded substantial weight in interpreting the statute." Itt. at 564.
166. 124 CONGo REC. 30.346-47 (1978) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
159.
160.
161.
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the similarity. First, he indicated that a prevailing plaintiff should
recover fees "unless special circumstances would render such an
award unjust."167 Second, a party prevailing through a consent
judgment or other settlement would be entitled to fees. 168 Third,
since the authorization of fees under section 505(b) was based on the
power of Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, it
was anticipated that fees would be awarded against local and state
governmental officials in their official capacity.169 Senator Cran
ston's statements were repeated, nearly verbatim, by Senator Staf
ford when he was commenting on the conference bill that ultimately
passed. 170 Finally, Senator Cranston, in the discussion of the confer
ence bill, emphasized the continuing applicability of his earlier re
marks concerning attorney fees. 171
It is quite apparent, therefore, that section 505(b) is just as
favorable to prevailing plaintiffs as section 1988. A number of courts
have awarded fees under section 505(b) to prevailing plaintiffs in
special education cases.172 Courts in other special education cases
have awarded fees under both section 1988 and section 505(b ).173
Fees have also been awarded under section 505(b) in a variety of
cases concerning the rights of persons with handicaps in areas other
than elementary and secondary education. 174
Although cases dealing with the elementary and secondary edu
cation rights of children with handicaps are often brought under
both the EAHCA and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, it is not un
167. ld at 30,347.
168. ld
169. ld
170. ld at 37,507-08 (statement of Sen. Stafford).
171. ld at 37,509 (statement of Sen. Cranston).
172. See, e.g. ,Gregg B. v. Board of Educ., 535 F. Supp. 1333, 1340 (E.D.N.Y.
1982); Patsel v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 660.666 (D.D.C. 1982);
Davis v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 1215, 1217 (D.D.C. 1982): Fells
v. Brooks, 522 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D.D.C. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of
Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 57(N.D. Ala. 1981); Tatro v. Texas. 516 F. Supp. 968. 985-87
(N.D. Tex. 1981).
173. Jose P. v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1982); Depanment of Educ. v.
Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 531-32 (D. Hawaii 1982); New Mexico Ass'n for Re
tarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391, 399 (D.N.M. I 980).rev'd and remanded
on orher grounds, 678 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1982).
174. Jones v. Illinois Dep't of Rehabilitation Servs .. 689 F.2d 724. 730-31 (7th Cir.
1982); Disabled in Action v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore. 685 F.2d 881 (4th Cir.
1982); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342 (8th Cir. 1980); Pushkin v.
Regents of the Univ. of Colorado, 504 F. Supp. 1292 (D. Colo.). aJrd. 658 F.2d 1372
(lOth Cir. 1981).

1983]

AITORNEY FEES

417

common for a court expressly to decide only the EAHCA claim. 175
As discussed in the previous section, the availability of fees to pre
vailing plaintiffs under the EAHCA is not at all clear and, therefore,
prevailing plaintiffs prefer to seek fees under section 505(b). A prob
lem arises, however, when the court either does not indicate which
statute it is relying upon in ruling for the plaintiffs or rules:in favor
of the plaintiff on the EAHCA claim without deciding the Rehabili
tation Act claim. In such a situation, the prevailing plaintiffs can
advance two arguments in'support of a request for fees under section
505(b).
The first, and most desirable argument, is that the regulations
implementing section 504 176 provide essentially the same rights to
elementary and secondary school children as the EAHCA and,
therefore, plaintiffs. ~ho prevail under the EAHCA automatically
are entitled to fees under section 505(b). This overlap or close rela
tionship between the EAHCA and section 504 has been. recognized
by the courts. For example, in Kaelin v. Grubbs 177 the court stated:
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. . . complements the Hand
icapped Children Act. Section 504 bars discrimination against
handicapped persons by programs or activities receiving federal
financial assistance. Many of the procedural protections provided
in the. Handicapped Children Act are also contained in Section
504's implementing regulations. . . . Specifically, the regulations
provide that plenary due process procedures govern the identifica-'
tion, evaluation, and· educational placement of a handicapped
child. . . . 178
175. Compare Doe v. Koger. 480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979) wilh Anderson v.
Thompson. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981). where the court did not have to consider an
award of fees under section 505(b) because a section 504 claim was not alleged in the
complaint. fa. at 1217 n.20.
.
176.' 45 C.F.R. § 84.1-.6 (1982).
177. 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982).
178. fa. at 597 (citations omitted). Compare Robert M. v. Benton. 671 F.2d 1104.
1106 (8th Cir. 1982); Jose P. v. Ambach. 669 F.2d 865. 871 (2d Cir. 1982); Hymes v.
Harnett County Bd. of Educ.• 664 F.2d 410. 413 n.4 (4th Cir. 1981); S-1 v. Turlington.
635 F.2d 342. 350 (5th Cir.). cerro denied. 454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Mitchell v. Walter. 538 F.
Supp. 1111. 1116-17 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Patsel V. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.• 530 F.
Supp. 660. 662-63 (D.D.C. 1982); Foster V. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.• 523 F.
Supp. 1142. 1144 (D.D.C. 1981); Davis V. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.• 522 F.
Supp. 1102. 1105 (D.D.C. 1981); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ.. 518 F.
Supp. 47.51 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Frazier. 517 F. Supp.
105. 118-23 (D. Colo. 1981); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ.. 471 F. Supp.
136. 139-40 (D.D.C. 1979); Howard V. Friendswood Indep. School Dist .. 454 F. Supp.
634.637-38 (S.D. Tex. 1978) wilh Monahan v. Nebraska. 687 F.2d 1164. 1169-71 (8th
Cir. 1982). For an application of section 504 to a state which does not participate in the
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The elementary and secondary education portion of the regula
tions implementing section 504 179 supports the decisions which inter
pret section 504 as coextensive with the EAHCAISO While section
504 was passed prior to the effective date of the relevant amend
ments to the EAHCA, the implementing regulations were not
adopted by HEW until it was ordered to do so by a federal court;
this was after the passage of the 1975 amendments to the EAHCAISI
In adopting the section 504 regulations, HEW was obviously con
cerned with the procedural rights of students with handicaps in
states which chose not to accept federal funding under the EAHCA
This is evident from the commentary to the regulation. ls2
This commentary further indicates that the subpart dealing with
elementary and secondary education "generally conforms to the
standards established for the education of handicapped persons in
[several cases) as well as in the [EAHCA)."ls3
If the EAHCA and section 504 are indeed coextensive, as sug
gested by the cases cited previouslylS4 and the regulations imple
menting section 504,185 then a plaintiff prevailing under the EAHCA
should automatically be entitled to fees under section 505(b), regard
less of whether the court explicitly rules on the section 504 claim.
funding available under the EAHCA. see New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v.
New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391 (D.N.M. 1980), rev'd and remanded. 678 F.2d 847 (10th
CiT. 1982) ("[e)vidence of the State's alleged [s)ection 504 violations must be evaluated by
the trial court in light of the Supreme Court's determination [in Southeastern Commu
nity College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979») that the statute and its regulations are
designed to prohibit discrimination rather than require affirmative action").
179. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31-.39 (1982).
180. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
181. See Cherry v. Mathews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976).
182. The commentary to the regulation states:
Under § 84.36. a recipient must establish a system of due process procedures to
be afforded to parents or guardians before the recipient takes any action regard
ing the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of a person. who.
because of handicap, needs or is believed to need special education or related
services. This section has been revised. Because the due process procedures of
the EHA. incorporated by reference in the proposed section 504 regulation. are
inappropriate for some recipients not subject to that Act. the section now speci
fies minimum necessary procedures: notice, a right to inspect records, an im
partial hearing with the right to representation by counsel, and a review
procedure. The EHA procedures remain one means of meeting the regulation'S
due process requirements, however, and are recommended to recipients as a
model.
45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A ~ 125 (1982); see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.36 (1982).
183. 45 C.F .R. § 84, app. A ~ 21 (1982).
184. See supra note 178.
185. See supra note 176.
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This is consistent with the situation where a non-fee statutory claim
is joined with a substantial constitutional claim and fees are sought
under section 1988. As indicated previously, the legislative history
suggests that the plaintiff who prevails on the non-fee claim should
be awarded fees without requiring the court to reach the constitu
tional question. 186 Several cases have relied on this legislative his
tory}87 It must be recognized that this analogy to cases with
statutory and constitutional claims has its limitations because the
strong policy against unnecessarily deciding constitutional issues
does not apply to cases presenting two statutory claims}88 Neverthe
less, judicial economy certainly argues against requiring the courts to
rule on a statutory claim that is relevant only to the attorney fee
issue. This is particularly true in this situation because, even if a
court concludes that the EAHCA and section 504 are not coexten
sive, where a plaintiff prevails under the EAHCA, the section 504
claim is certainly substantial.
An alternative is to require the court to rule on both the
EAHCA and section 504 claims. While it seems to run contrary to
considerations of judicial economy, there is some support in the leg
islative history to section 1988 for·this alternative}89 In passing sec
tion 1988, Congress anticipated that some cases would include both
fee and non-fee statutory claims.
To the extent a plaintiff joins a claim under Olle of the statutes
enumerated in [the fees act] with a claim that does not allow attor
ney fees, that plaiDtiff, if it prevails on the non-fee claim, is enti
tled to a determination on the other claim for the purpose of
awarding counsel fees. l90

The legislative history cites Morales v. Haines,191 but it does not ac
tually support the conclusion reached. In Morales, the district court
ruled in favor of plaintiff on his constitutional claim and the appel
late court remanded the case for a determination of the statutory
186. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 21.
188. See Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 586 n.12 (D. R.I. 1982).
189. The greater the coun perceives the difference between the two acts, the more
additional time it will take to decide both claims. See Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d
1164, 1169-71 (1982). On the other hand, if the coun concludes that the two statutes
provide essentially the same rights, then ruling on both will not require additional coun
time.
190. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Congo 2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976) (citation omitted).
191. 349 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1972), offd in pari, vacated and remanded in part.
486 F .2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973).
.
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claims l92 because of the request for damages and attorney fees. 193
The court, therefore, had to decide the statutory claims for purposes
of relief other than attorney fees. 194
As a matter of policy, where the plaintiff prevails under the
EAHCA and a claim for the same relief under section 504 is at least
substantial, fees should be awarded under section 505(b) without a
formal ruling on the section 504 claim. Where the court views the
section 504 claim as questionable,19s then it should proceed and de
cide the merits of the section 504 claim unless fees are awarded
under section 1988.

III.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs in suits to enforce the elementary and secondary edu
cational rights of children with handicaps have three federal sources
of substantive rights: the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution;196 the EAHCA;197 and section 504 of the Rehabilita
tion Act of 1973}98 The strongest ofthese three in terms of substan
tive rights is the EAHCA and, unfortunately, it presents the greatest
difficulty in seeking an award of attorney fees. Plaintiffs prevailing
under either the Constitution or section 504 are in a very good posi
tion to recover fees under sections 1988 and 505(b). Therefore, in
most situations plaintiffs should assert claims under all three
provisions.
A claim under the fourteenth amendment is both the most diffi
cult to win on the merits and the least likely to be decided by the
court. It is not necessary, however, to prevail on this claim in order
to recover fees under section 1988. 199 To the extent that plaintiffs
can convince the Court that the fourteenth amendment claim is sub
stantial, fees can be awarded under that section. The substantiality
of the fourteenth amendment claim will usually be addressed by the
court when deciding defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to
192. Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973). These included claims under
42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 as well as under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 3604,3612.
Id at 88l.
193. Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880, 882 (7th Cir. 1973).
194. It is not clear why the constitutional claim was decided before the statutory
claims.
195. This would usually occur in a situation where the court is concerned about the
questions raised in Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (8th Cir. 1982).
196. See SIIpra note l.
197. See SIIpra note 2.
198. See SIIpra note 3.
199. See SIIpra text accompanying notes 10-32.

1983)

ATTORNEY FEES

421

state a claim. Under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in
Hagans v. Lavine ,200 the constitutional claim should normally sur
vive a motion to dismiss. Assuming there is a constitutional basis for
the relief sought in the complaint, denial of the motion to dismiss
should assure an award of attorney fees under section 1988 if the
plaintiff ultimately prev~ils .on a statutory claim.
Concerning the statutory claims under the EAHCA and section
504, it is generally advisable for plaintiff to pursue relief under both.
That is, in seeking relief-whether in the form of a request for a
preliminary injunction, a motion for summary judgment, or at
trial-plaintiff should attempt to pursue these two claims as one.
The goal is, of course, to have the court rule in favor of plaintiff on
the basis of both the EAHCA. and section 504. If this is accom
plished, then plaintiff is entitled to fees under either section 1988,
because of the substantial constitutional claim, or section 505(b), be
cause of the successful claim under section 504.
It is entirely possible that the court will want to avoid ruling on
the section 504 claim because of the potential problems suggested by
the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis .201
When this happens, plaintiff should pursue relief on the merits under
the EAHCA and, only after prevailing under that statute, address
the fee issue. Again, if there is a substantial constitutional claim
under the fourteenth amendment, plaintiff should recover fees with
out resort to section 505(b). On the other hand, if there is not a sub
stantial constitutional claim, then plaintiff will have to ask the court
to rule on the section 504 claim solely for the purpose of awarding
fees- or seek fees pursuant to section 1988 on the theory that the
EAHCA can be enforced through section 1983.
In order to preserve all options relating to attorney fees, plaintiff
should exhaust state administrative remedies under the EAHCA, as
suming adequate remedies are available and exhaustion would not
be futile. Section 615 of the EAHCA expressly requires resort to
state mandated administrative remedies before bringing an action in
court; courts; however, have recognized the normal exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement. 202 While most courts have not required ex
200. 415 U.S. 528, 534-43 (1974).
201. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The Court stated that. "[s)ection 504 imposes no require
ment upon an educational institution to lower or to effect substantial modifications of
standards to accommodate a handicapped person." fd at 413. See, e.g.. Monahan v.
Nebraska. 687 F.2d 1164, 1169-71 (8th Cir. 1982); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp.
1375, 1388 (D.R.l. 1982); Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 586-88 (D.R.L 1982).
202. See supra note 134.
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haustion prior to bringing a section 504 claim in court,203 if it is nec
essary to exhaust these remedies under the EAHCA, there is
generally no reason not to exhaust all available administrative reme
dies and raise all claims.
Exhaustion is not required in a section 1983 action to enforce
the fourteenth amendment. 204 Assuming administrative proceedings
are pursued, all legal claims should be raised before the administra
tive agency. This not only precludes a later assertion by the defend
ants that only some claims were exhausted, it also lays the
groundwork for an award of fees for the time spent in pursuing ad
ministrative proceedings. 205
Plaintiffs prevailing in cases to enforce the educational rights of
children with handicaps should normally be allowed to recover fees
under either section 198~ or section 505(b). Yet, because the
EAHCA does not itself provide for fees and because the availability
of section 1983 to enforce the EAHCA is uncertain, the issue is not
as clear, nor as simple as advocates of children with handicaps
would prefer.

203. See, e.g., Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 978 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied. 103 S.
Ct. 215 (1982). The court cited cases on both sides of the exhaustion issue. Id at 978-79
n.lO.
204. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982). Some courts have sug·
gested that section 1983 cannot be utilized to enforce the EAHCA unless the state admin·
istrative remedies mandated by section 615 are exhausted. H.R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F.
Supp. 215, 222-23 (D. Md. 1981); Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
This is not necessarily inconsistent with Palsy because the Court indicated exhaustion
would still be required prior to suing under section 1983 where Congress makes an ex·
ception to the no·exhaustion rule. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 102 S. Ct. at 2564-66. See
Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577, 583 n.4 (D.R.I. 1982).
205. See, e.g., Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F. Supp. 577,583 (D. R.I. 1982); Department of
Educ. v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 531 (D. Hawaii 1982); Patsel v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Educ., 530 F. Supp. 660, 667 (D.D.C. 1982). The Supreme Court has
approved fees for work done in connection with administrative proceedings mandated by
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.c. §§ 2000e-2000e·17 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54,61-63 (1980).

